Water authorities in countries facing water shortage problems are implementing intermittent water supply (IWS) policies, as a measure to conserve and control their national water resources. 
INTRODUCTION
Countries facing extended periods of drought and short supply of fresh water are increasingly turning to intermittent water supply (IWS) operations in order to reduce water consumption and to prolong their national water reserves. In doing so, water distribution network (WDN) managers change the modus operandi of their piping networks and risk affecting negatively the network's vulnerability level.
Unfortunately, though, the number of research works in literature on the effects of IWS operations on the vulnerability of WDNs is limited.
In appraising the impact of IWS policies, one should examine the results of implementing such policies on the condition of the pipeline system. Reliable conclusions can only be drawn by thoroughly studying the performance of the WDN before, during and after implementing the IWS measures, and by drawing conclusions on the change of a WDN's vulnerability as a result of IWS policies.
The work presents two different models on the performance of a case-study WDN subjected to IWS operations for a two-year period. The aforementioned IWS period was applied during the period from 31/3/2008 to 31/1/2010 and involved the separation of sub-district metered areas (DMAs) into four areas to which water was sequentially supplied for a time period of 12 hours. During the early months of the IWS period, the plan was fully implemented but there-state of the case-study WDN. The analyses included in this model aim for a study of the impact of added IWS data on the time to failure (TTF) of the WDN's elements. If the IWS policy's impact is detrimental to the WDN condition, then the TTF of the elements should be negatively affected.
The second model, which is applied on the same WDN, uses survival analysis for the evaluation of the WDN condition under continuous water supply (CWS) and IWS operations.
Similarly, if the impact of the IWS policy on the WDN condition is detrimental, then the results given by the CWS and IWS analyses will diverge.
The aforementioned models are an extension of research efforts reported by Agathokleous () and Agathokleous & Christodoulou (c) .
State of knowledge
Even though a great volume of work on WDNs has already been performed, very little work has been reported in literature with regard to IWS operations and their effects on the vulnerability of WDNs which have been designed for CWS. In the past few decades, researchers have developed several models examining and simulating the operations and condition of WDNs. The models varied from mathematical models expressing the failure pattern or system reliability, to multi-objective failure models, and to multi-factored simulation systems. Recent research activities focused on abnormal operating conditions due to exogenous factors and their effects on the condition of a WDN.
Shamir & Howard () developed mathematical relationships which express the time from pipe installation until the first failure incident, and the failure frequencies after the first failure occurred. Andreou et al. () used proportional hazards models to estimate failure at an early pipe age, and a Poisson-type model for the later stages. Also
Goulter & Kazemi () presented a non-homogeneous
Poisson distribution model which predicts the probability of successive breaks. Kleiner & Rajani () proposed a framework to assess future rehabilitation needs using limited and incomplete data on pipe conditions. An approach that can be used to optimize the replacement and rehabilitation activities for WDN pipes was presented by Hong et al. reported on the performance of WDNs under IWS, citing that of the 12,000 water-loss incidents in a two-year period the majority were related to house connections (HC) and small-diameter pipes, with an increase in incidents during the intermittent supply period of about 28% compared to the normal operating conditions period (uninterrupted supply). Moving a step further, Agathokleous & Christodoulou (a, b) reported that WDNs which were designed for continuous operation are negatively affected by the implementation of IWS policies. Furthermore, they concluded based on an eight-year case study that IWS operations are not an efficient water-saving measure but they can be used as a water-management policy. • Time period 'C': The analysis associated with this period uses incidents from the total time period for which there are recorded data (the time period before, during and after IWS application).
CASE STUDY AND DATASET
• Time period 'IWS': The analysis associated with this period uses incidents that happened during the IWS period.
The analyses for the first three time periods (A, B and C) are the essential ones of the WDN in study, while the analysis that is associated with the IWS period is exploratory and is used to confirm the findings. The case-study dataset was examined by use of decision trees and survival analysis, and by use of data stratifications of various levels. to be known, all elements whose 'birth date' was unknown were excluded from the analysis. Additionally, the 'date of failure' and the 'date of rebirth' were considered to be the date that a leak-related incident was reported. The analysis performed was at street (and not component) level and the time from previous action was used as a response variable. 1914 days) is depicted in Figure 5 . The most important information stemming from the analysis is as follows:
1. Next action for a connection pipe which did not experience any previous breaks is expected in 176 days.
2. Next repair action for a connection pipe element that has 1-4 previous breaks is expected in 144 days. This result is in line with the previous statement because as the NOPB increases, the TTF decreases dramatically.
3. Next repair action for an HC element that has 5-8 previous breaks is expected in 90 days. This result is in line with the previous statements because as the NOPB increases, the TTF decreases dramatically.
4. Next action for an HC element that has 9-12 previous breaks is expected in 77 days. This result is in line with the previous statements because as the NOPB increases, the TTF decreases dramatically.
5. Next repair action for an HC element that has 13-16 previous breaks is expected in 54 days. This result is in line with the previous statements because as the NOPB increases, the TTF decreases dramatically. includes additional data and covers a longer period, it is expected that the TTF will significantly increase compared to the other two periods (period A and period B). The This result is in line with the other two since pipes survive longer than fittings.
Next repair action for a connection pipe element that has
1-4 previous breaks is expected in 151 days. This result is in line with finding (1), because as the NOPB increases the TTF decreases.
5. Next replacement action for an HC element that has 1-4 previous breaks is expected in 176 days.
6. Next action for a plastic HC element that has 5-8 previous breaks is expected in 117 days.
7. Next action for an HC element that has 9-12 previous breaks is expected in 87 days.
8. Next action for an HC element that has 13-16 previous breaks is expected in 77 days. This result is in line with the previous one because as the NOPB increases, the TTF decreases.
9. Next action for a plastic HC element that has more than 16 previous breaks is expected in 47 days. This result is in line with the conclusion (6) because as the NOPB increases, the TTF decreases. 
SURVIVAL ANALYSIS
To further investigate the effects of IWS on WDN vulnerability, the analysis was complimented with survival analysis. The findings of the survival analysis are discussed below.
Methodology
Survival analysis is a branch of statistics dealing with deterioration and failure over time. It involves the modelling of the elapsed time between an initiating event and a terminal event. In the case of WDNs, an initiating event is
represented by the date of pipe installation, a near-terminal 
where T is the elapsed time until the occurrence of a specified event; i is an index; D t is the set of all failures (deaths) that occur at time T t and d t is the number of deaths in this set; R t is the set of all individuals that are at risk immediately before time T t and r t is the number of individuals in this risk set. T min refers to a minimum time below which failures are not considered (often used when data are left truncated).
The survival analysis presented herein is based on incidents related to two pipe classes, namely the WM and the HC. Analysis of each pipe class consists data of two part types that are the 'Pipe' and 'Fitting' elements. Since these analyses are examining the effect on the condition of the WDN for a specific time period and because of the existence of left-censored data causing shifting of survival curves, it was decided that elements whose birth date (i.e. installation date) is unknown they should be excluded. Additionally, the 'date of failure' and the 'date of rebirth' were considered to be the date that a leak-related incident was reported. The analysis performed was at street level.
It should be noted that if the IWS operations are of no impact to the condition of the WDN then (1) the survival curves, of the aforementioned four time periods (A, B, C and IWS) will have the same approximate shape, and (2) the TTF and the probability of survival should improve when the time period of analysis and the number of incidents associated with it increase.
Analysis, results and discussion
WM class
The first analysis group refers to the WM class elements.
This class includes all those pipe and fitting elements that constitute the main pipeline of a WDN. Figure 7 illustrates the resulting survival probability curves for the 'WM pipe' class incidents, for the time periods in study.
The survival probability curve for time period 'A' Finally, a survival analysis of the recorded data associated with the 'WM' class during the IWS period is were not available for inclusion in the analysis. The result of the last analysis confirmed the conclusions that have been derived by the previous three analyses.
HC class
The second analysis group refers to the HC class elements.
This class includes all pipe and fitting elements that connect the consumers' water meters to the WM pipeline. Figure 8 illustrates the resulting survival probability curves for the 'HC pipe' class incidents, for the time periods in study.
The survival probability curve of time period 'A' lasts 957 days. The survival probability is reduced by only 17% during the first 600 days of the element's life. The drop in the survival probability is low up to the 925 days of the 
